by Ian Greenhalgh
I was chatting to my dad yesterday, which was Remembrance Sunday, 11th November, an occasion Britain still takes very seriously. He asked me what World War One was about as it seemed so pointless and futile.
Well, I said, have you heard of the Balfour Declaration? Then I went on to explain all about it, how the British Foreign Secretary in late 1916, as the incredibly bloody Battle of The Somme was drawing to a close, had written a letter to Lord Rothschild, who was acting on behalf of the Zionist International; in said letter, he promised to give them Palestine, which was the first step towards the eventual creation of Israel.
I explained how the Zonists had first gone to the German Kaiser with the same request – that he give them Palestine in return for their assistance in winning the war. The Kaiser, despite his failings, was a scrupulously honourable man; therefore he declined their offer giving the perfectly correct reason that Palestine belonged to his Ally, the Ottoman Empire and therefore was not his to give. So the Zionists went to the British with the same offer and the British took it.
This is why the British sent one of their best army commanders – General Allenby to the Middle East to take command in Egypt and greatly expanded the British forces in that theatre at a time when the Western Front was placing immense demands on manpower and fighting troops were badly needed.
Before Allenby’s arrival, the fighting in the Middle East had been confined to the British successfully defeating a Turkish advance into Egypt’s Sinai desert, a disastrous Indian Army expedition into Iraq that ended in the awful Siege of Kut and the capture of the entire British Indian force; and most famously, the small scale support of the Arab Revolt through the sending of a liaison officer who greatly overstepped his orders and became the legendary Lawrence of Arabia.
Lawrence’s campaign had been restricted to blowing up bits of the Hejaz railway and nuisance raids against isolated Ottoman garrisons, the British had yet to supply sufficient arms and gold to really ignite the revolt into a serious problem for the Ottomans.
However, once the Balfour Declaration had been issued and Allenby arrived with large numbers of reinforcements in tow, the arms and gold Lawrence needed for the Revolt were furnished in abundance. Watch the film – all this is depicted and it’s a superb piece of filmmaking, a true epic of the cinema.
It took Allenby the whole of 1917 and 1918 to fight his way north from Egypt’s Sinai up through Gaza, then the Jordan Valley and on through the Judean hills and the coastal fertile plain to take first Jerusalem and then end the war in Damascus.
Thus Palestine was conquered on behalf of the Zionists and the beginning of the Israel project. Australian troops formed the backbone of this army and the film The Lighthorsemen is worth watching to get a feel for the nature of this fighting, as well as being a very good, entertaining movie.
So that’s what the British did to fulfil the Balfour Declaration, but what did the Zionist International do to fulfil their side of the bargain and ensure Britain won the war? The plan was twofold; firstly, they cut off Germany’s supply of essential materiel, including finance ad secondly, they bought the US into the war, thus providing several million corn-fed midwest doughboys to join the Allies in France and overwhelm the Germans through sheer weight of numbers.
Those that have been paying attention will have raised an eyebrow when I said that Germany’s supplies were cut off, for the simple reason that very few are aware that Germany had only been able to fight as long as she had because she was receiving all the supplies she needed but could not produce domestically which were needed to clothe, feed and arm her forces. German soldiers were fed on imported beef, their backs covered with imported cloth and their explosives manufactured from imported chemicals.
But how were these imports getting through, after all, everyone knows that the British Royal Navy had blockaded Germany and successfully shutdown all trade into German ports such as Hamburg and Kiel? The answer is both simple and obvious – they were carried on both neutral and British flagged vessels into the ports of the neutral countries of Holland, Denmark and Sweden to then be transshipped on to Germany and thus sustain her war machine.
Without this secret trade, the war would have been like all European wars that preceded it – the two sides would have fought for a few months the, both exhausted and running out of money, they would come to the peace table and sign a treaty, usually exchanging a province or two, as the French had in 1870 when they handed Alsace-Lorraine to Germany after being defeated in the Franco-Prussian War. However, thanks to the secret supplying of Germany through the neutral backdoor, this war was able to be prolonged for almost five long, bloody years.
Which brings us to the title of this article and it’s reference to Hitler’s infamous claim that Germany lost World War One because the Zionist Jews stabbed her in the back. Of course, orthodox history insists this was a great lie, but let me assure you, it was absolutely true and I will explain how the stabbing took place.
I have already explained that the Zionist Jews took two main actions against Germany in late 1916 in return for the British making the Balfour Declaration with the first action being the entry of the US into the war and the second being the cutting off of the supplies to Germany. As I stated, Germany was being supplied via neutral ports, you don’t have to take my word for it, you can read all about this trade in great detail, including all the actual figures of materiel shipped in the book The Triumph of Unarmed Forces, 1914-1918. By Rear-Admiral M. W. W. P. Consett, C.M.U. London: William and Norgate.
In this book, Rear-Admiral Montagu William Warcop Peter Consett exposes the truth of how WWI was a complete fraud, a manufactured war that was artificially lengthened through secret trade and gives all the facts and figures to prove it. Amazingly, this most dangerous book is once more in print and available at Amazon:
Consett explains that this roaring trade went on for the first two and a half years of the war, coming to a rather abrupt end around the end of 1916, which is just after the Balfour Declaration was issued.
Therefore, in this little book, lies the poof that the stab in the back was all too real; the Germans were soon running out of materials of all kinds, the home front became the scene of starvation, with the winter of 1917-18 becoming notoriously known as the ‘Turnip Winter’ because all they had left to eat by then were turnips, a foodstuff that before the war, was not consumed in Germany, being seen as only fit for feeding to livestock.
Even in the front lines, the Germans were noticeably running out of essentials as cloth bandages were replaced by ineffective tissue paper and ration staples such as coffee were replaced by ersatz replacements made of things like chicory and acorns. Meat became scarce and the soldiers had to tighten their belts, by the end of the war, the German Army was composed of skinny, malnourished men.
One of the lesser known reasons for the failure of the great German spring offensives of 1918 is this slow, steady starvation of the Germans; when the German stormtruppen broke through the Allied lines and rampaged into the rear areas they found vast quantities of rations and supplies piled everywhere in incredible profusion, there were all kinds of things that had not been seen in Germany for years, real tobacco, Gin and Rum imported from far afield, Scottish Whiskey, French wine, vast stockpiles of cakes, biscuits, jam, chocolate, cheese, meat of all kinds, it was too much for the starving Germans to resist, many of them simply laid down their arms, pulled out their knives and forks and gorged themselves on food and drink, ignoring their officer’s pleas to continue the advance until they had eaten and drank their fill.
This broke the momentum of the offensive and gave the Allies precious time to mount an effective defense in depth.
Hitler was present in the trenches and lived through all this, he knew firsthand how it had felt to seethe strength of the German Army slowly fading away as it’s men grew ever skinnier, as diseases became widespread, as munitions became scarce, he was there to witness the terrible collapse of the final few months in the face of continual Allied offensives, he knew from bitter personal experience that the German Army could have done no more, have given no more blood to the cause, therefore knew that the reason for it’s collapse was that they had been undermined and their strength sapped by an unseen hand – the German Army felt it had not been defeated in the field, rather, it had been stabbed in the back.
The German Army was right, they had been stabbed in the back and Hitler was also right when he identified the Jews as the ones who had wielded the dagger.
Here is a summary of Consett’s book.
ADMIRAL Consett is the first writer who has dealt fully and statistically with the way in which Germany during the War obtained such supplies as a full exercise of our sea’ ‘power would have prevented from reaching her. This is an extremely important subject;though we must also add a very complicated one, and we are grateful to Admiral Consett for having written this book. In all future discussions of the subject it will be quite indispensable for its documentary evidence.
No one was in a better position than Admiral Consett to keep track of the supplies that went into Germany through Scandinavia and Holland in the first two and a-half years of the War. He was naval attaché in Scandinavia from 1912-1919. The irony and the tragedy of it was that a tremendous proportion of these supplies came from Great Britain herself. We, in fact, diligently supplied and fed our enemy.
In Admiral Consett’s view Germany would have collapsed perhaps a couple of years sooner but for this help, which she had not dreamed that we would ever give her or allow to reach her. Those who are content to regard the question simply from the point of view of failure to apply the physical power which we possessed will, of course, say that the British Government was guilty of a crime.
But the question is not nearly so simple as that. There was also a political side to it. Few people need to be reminded of the way in which America championed the cause of the neutrals in the early part of the War. There were times when the ugly prospect had actually to be faced that if a few more restrictions were put on the trade of neutrals America would become our opponent instead of our potential friend. She might have cut off the supply of munitions. Admiral Consett is not unmindful of this difficulty ; he touches on it ; but in our opinion he does not allow nearly enough weight to it.
Scandinavia, as he admits, was dependent upon her overseas supplies. Could we have isolated Scandinavia and Holland from the beginning of the War on the ground that whatever they bought from us would be sure to be passed on to Germany ? Could we have done this, we ask, without alienating the sympathies of the impartial world which we certainly deserved and which for the most part, as it was, we enjoyed?
Admiral Consett says that Scandinavia had always expected to suffer if there should be a European war in which Great Britain was involved and that she was surprised that we called upon her to suffer so little. His evidence on that point satisfies us less than his evidence about the supplies which undoubtedly passed through to Germany.
The political atmosphere which belligerents create for themselves during war is a matter of greater moral significance than some people would allow it to be. Another point worth noticing is that Scandinavia necessarily imported directly much more than before since great neighbouring ports, like Hamburg, were closed.
We felt bound to make these reservations before coming to Admiral Consett’s facts, but having made them we are now free to summarize what he says and to emphasize its importance. His facts are, indeed, astonishing. Scandinavia and Holland promised that goods- imported from us would be used in the country of their reception and not be transmitted to Germany.
Admiral Consett says that these promises were useless. He brings out very clearly what we confess we had not appreciated before, that a large part of the American indignation against us at the beginning of the War was based on the fact that Great Britain was, so to speak, competing with America in sending goods to neutral Europe. America complained that Great Britain, though a competitor, imposed unnecessary rules on her rival. One competitor was fixing the handicap of the other.
This curious situation was obscured at the time owing to the contradictory statements of the Government. Thus on January 26th, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil stated in Parliament that ” not much was going through neutral countries ” to Germany.
Yet in a message about the same time to America in answer to one of her complaints the Government said : ” It is common knowledge that large quantities of supplies have passed to our enemies through neutral ports.” The message went on to say that neutral ports had, in fact, been ” the main avenues through which supplies have reached the enemy.” Naturally America retorted : ” What about the supplies you are sending yourself ? “
We may fairly assert, however, that the conduct of Great Britain, in many respects inimical to herself, was based on a generally scrupulous regard for pledges that she had given or implied, and for the customs of war. The Treaty of London, which had not been. ratified owing to the wise intervention of the House of Lords, was at first acted upon as though it had full validity. As everyone knows, it seriously detracted from our ability to make war effectually.
Admiral Consett shows that the excess over our normal exports to Scandinavia amounted often to 200 or 300 per cent., and in some cases even to 1,000 per cent. Germany was thus enabled to stem the tide of starvation and to pull through 1916 and 1917. He says that in the first seven months of 1916 ” the meat export alone during this period, 62,561 tons, was sufficient to furnish about 1,000,000 meat rations per day throughout the seven months on the scale of the current German Army ration.”
We cannot give many examples of Admiral Consett’s remarkable figures, but yr! must mention a few as typical. During the first four months of 1915, the increases in the amount of cocoa exported from Great Britain to Scandinavia, Holland and Italy as compared with the corresponding period in 1913 were almost tenfold greater.
Coal was sent apparently without restriction to Scandinavia, and it was handed on freely to Germany. Denmark exported horses, cattle and food to Germany, while we supplied her with the fodder and fertilizers for producing them. We also supplied the apparatus of fishing, and it is to be noted that as a result, or at all events partly as a result, Denmark and Sweden sent to Germany forty-six times the amount of fish which they sent to this country. Great Britain more than doubled the amount of oil seeds, tallow, lard, fish oils, animal oils and fats which she sent to Scandinavia, and these went into Germany for the manufacture of glycerine used in high explosives.
In 1913 Great Britain sent to Denmark 150 tons of lubricants ; in 1915 she sent 500 tons. Why ? The export of copper to Sweden doubled ; simultaneously the export of copper from Sweden to Germany trebled. In the first six weeks of 1916 we allowed 20,000 tons of zinc ore to go to Rotterdam. Thence it went to Liege. In 1915 we sent to Sweden twelve times the amount of nickel we had sent in 1913. Cotton was not declared contraband till August, 1915. In 1913 we had sent 1,940 tons of cotton to Sweden ; in 1915 we sent 10,300. The exports of cotton to Norway and Denmark rose correspondingly. Our exports of flax, jute, skins, phosphate, pyrites, sulphate of ammonia, rubber and many other things all increased greatly. Admiral Consett says that cement was the only commodity that formed the subject of particular inquiry when the general question of our trade during the War was raised.
Consideration for neutrals, although in our opinion politically and morally necessary, surely provides no excuse for these huge increases over the normal. One would have thought that the obvious thing to do was to ration Scandinavia and to take our exports in the year before the War as the maximum figure allowable.
After two and a-half years Admiral Consett’s advice was acted upon, and we did proceed on the rationing principle. But why not sooner ? America, so far from objecting, would have welcomed any restrictions we laid upon ourselves.