Hôm nay 30-4 năm 2011, 36 năm đã trôi qua, thời gian tưởng là làm nhạt nhòa ký ức, nhưng hình ảnh hệ quả của 30-4 nó còn hiện rõ từng chi tiết trong đầu. Không phải vì Tôi cố nhớ nó, mà 30-4 với những hệ quả kéo dài đến hôm nay, chính nó đã buộc thằng Tôi phải nhớ nó. Và Tôi đã nhớ rất rõ cái cảm xúc của một niềm vui và ba nỗi buồn của riêng Tôi với ấn dấu 30-4-1975.

Với Tôi, biến cố 30- 4 đầu tiên là một niềm vui không thể nhầm lẫn. Vui vì cuộc chiến tương tàn, dài đăng đẳng đầy man rợ phi nghĩa  đã chấm dứt. Chiến tranh, dù vì bất cứ lý do gì, nguyên nhân nào đều ghê tởm, không chỉ vì nó tàn phá làng mạc, đất đai, tàn sát nhân mạng, mà chính vì nó  tàn hủy nhân tính, băng hoại con người. Chiến tranh chỉ có lợi cho bọn bất nhân, vì nó luôn là cái cớ cho não trạng độc tài  quân phiệt phát huy bản năng thú vật của loài thượng đẳng hai chân, và cuối cùng chiến tranh muôn đời luôn luôn là trò làm tiền của bọn gian manh bất nhân , đúng như tướng thủy quân lục chiến Mỹ ông Smedley Butler (1881-1940) đã vạch ra trong bài diễn thuyết “chiến tranh là trò làm tiền gian manh” (War is a Racket). Chiến tranh  nó ghê tởm đến độ đại tướng Eisenhower, người từng chỉ huy liên quân đồng minh trong thế chiến thứ hai và sau này là tổng thống thứ 34 của Mỹ, đã phải thốt ra:

 “Tôi căm ghét Chiến Tranh chỉ vì Tôi là một người lính từng sống trong đó có thể ghét, chỉ vì là người đã thấy sự tàn bạo của nó, sư vô ích của nó, sự ngu xuẩn của nó……. Từng khẩu súng được chế tạo, từng chiến hạm ra khơi, từng trái pháo được bắn đi, biểu hiện trong một ý nghĩa cuối cùng là một hành động ăn cắp của những người đói khổ mà không có ăn, của những người chết rét mà không có mặc..(I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity…….Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. Four Star-General-President of The USA, Dwight D. Eisenhower)

Không những vậy, với tư cách là vị tướng kinh nghiệm dày dạn, nếm đủ mùi chiến tranh tàn bạo, một tổng thống của quốc gia hùng mạnh còn sót lại sau thế chiến, trong bài diễn văn từ biệt hết nhiệm kỳ, giã từ chính trường, Ông đã cảnh báo người Mỹ và thế giới về hiểm họa chiến tranh do bọn đầu cơ kỹ nghệ vũ khí tiến hành. Bọn trục lợi và sùng bái quyền lực sẽ tạo chiến tranh bằng mọi cách.

Vì thế, Tôi không chỉ vui mừng hơn cả những người lính ngoại nhân tham chiến còn sống sót trở về quê  hương của họ, mà còn vui mừng chúc lành cho họ, đã còn có thể sống sót trở về đoàn tụ với thân nhân gia đình, dù biết chắc rằng sau cuộc chiến man rợ phi nghĩa đó, nhiều cuộc đời con người đã không thể còn toàn vẹn được nữa.

Đó chính là lý do Tôi vui mừng khi biến cố ngày 30-4-1975 xảy đến. Tôi kinh tởm chiến tranh. Chỉ có vậy thôi.

Tôi không còn là người đần độn bị ám hữu bởi chủ nghĩa ái quốc, quốc gia dân tộc, cho nên cái lý cớ “thống nhất đất nước” với tôi, nó không chỉ thừa thãi vô ích mà còn đê tiện và nguy hiểm. Bởi hôm nay đây, không chỉ những con người ở những xã hội dân chủ văn minh người ta rời bỏ nơi này để sống ở nơi khác phù hợp với hạnh phúc của họ hơn, rồi đôi lúc quay trở lại thăm quê cũ như là một du khách bình thường và hạnh phúc; mà người Việt nam hôm nay, khi có điều kiện cũng đang hành xử như thế, và cũng rất hạnh phúc chính đáng. Hơn thế nữa, không chỉ ở cương vị cá nhân con người tự tại, thoát khỏi căn bệnh ái quốc ái quần tổ quốc tổ cò, mà ngay cả ở mức độ một cộng đồng xã hội, người ta cũng không nhất thiết bị ràng buộc pháp lý  hay tinh thần với mảnh đất hay cái tên của một hiện thể chính trị  quốc gia, chỉ vì họ được sinh ra ở đó một cách ngẫu nhiên không có chọn lựa.  Như QueBec trưng cầu dân ý để tách ra khỏi Canada, hay Vermont đang tiến hành vận động trưng cầu dân ý tách ra khỏi Mỹ, hoặc Đài Loan muốn độc lập tách hẳn khỏi Trung Quốc v.v Người ta đã tiến xa hơn, tầm nhìn rộng hơn với giá trị NHÂN PHẨM làm nền tảng, và người ta chỉ trân trọng tìm đến mảnh đất nào,  liên đới kết nhập với xã hội nào có chủ trương vinh danh Con Người, chăm chút nhân phẩm và hạnh phúc tự do của thành viên, của công dân, thì đó là đất nước của họ. Đó là chưa kể những tổ quốc tổ cò đã biến mất như tổ  quốc “Liên Xô vĩ đại”.

Cho nên, ví giả mà nói, đừng vì những trò chính trị bẩn thỉu bất nhân của bọn đầu nậu quyền lực như Hồ, Diệm, Nga, Mỹ v.v cứ để “nước Nam” và “nước Bắc” độc lập mà sống, mà phát triển theo năng lực ý thích của mình, chẳng cần thống nhất thống nhéo gì, miễn đời sống tự do dân chủ hạnh phúc là tốt. Nếu giả như bây giờ Viêt Nam có tách làm ba (3) để MỌI NGƯỜI ĐƯỢC SỐNG tốt đẹp hơn, hạnh phúc hơn, Tôi ủng hộ cả cuộc đời tôi cho nhu cầu VÀ MỤC ĐÍCH CHÍNH ĐÁNG này. Bởi Tôi cũng đang thấy trước mắt Tôi, nơi Tôi đang sống, những con người dù có cùng văn hóa ngôn ngữ, nhưng thành lập những quốc gia xã hội khác nhau mà không cần thống nhất, như Ấn, Hồi, Bangladesh, Anh Mỹ, Canada, Tân Tây Lan, Trung Quốc, Đài Loan, Singapore v.v Người ta sống vui hơn hạnh phúc hơn, tự do hơn, ý nghĩa hơn, và xứng đáng hơn! Chứ chẳng mất mát hay đau khổ gì khi “xa tổ quốc tổ cò , hay thiếu vắng tổ tiên, dân tộc  giống nòi gì  cả”.  Đó là chưa nói nhiều lúc phải đánh vào mặt thằng “tổ quốc tổ tiên” để thoát khổ đau, thoát nô lệ như Mỹ, như Úc như Đài Loan v.v  Người ta sáp lại, nối kết với nhau khi nhu cầu cần thiết để cùng xây dựng một xã hội tốt hơn vì nhau và cho nhau,  và  chỉ bằng  sự tự nguyện đồng thuận, chứ không bằng bạo lực cưỡng ép áp đặt. Bạo lực không bao giờ đưa đến điều gì tốt đẹp.

Đấy, cái  tính “thống nhất bằng bạo lực” qua sự man rợ bịp bợm của chủ nghĩa ái quốc dân tộc, nó làm cho tôi có nỗi buồn thứ nhất về ngày 30-4. Chính cái tính ái quốc dân tộc bịp bợm này, càng ngày nó càng làm con người có cái tên Việt Nam cứ càng xa nhau, thù nhau “đậm đà bản sắc dân tộc” hơn trước nữa.

Ngay sau 30-4-75, cũng nhân danh bảo vệ tổ quốc, an ninh tổ quốc, những thằng chiến thắng từ mảnh đất phía Bắc đã cai trị kẻ đồng bào bại trận của nó  ở phía Nam như cai trị thuộc địa chiếm đóng. Thái độ hành xử thực dân cai trị trong một đất nước này kéo dài cho đến bây giờ chưa thôi.

Đảng CSVN, Nó và một số người dân cùng quan điểm với nó, hành xử với người miền Nam bại trận bằng cả phong cách và chính sách chiếm đóng và cưỡng đoạt; Nó chia thành phần, vùng miền trong mọi lãnh vực sinh hoạt của đòi sống xã hội miền Nam sau 30-4 1975. Chính sách xét duyệt LÝ LỊCH được TẬN DỤNG và TRIỆT ĐỂ trong mọi lãnh vực.

nguyngucVà những thằng bại trận bỏ chạy cũng vậy, cũng vẫn nhân danh ái quốc tổ cò, dù đã thành công dân xứ người,  cũng phân chia thành phần vùng miền ngay trong cái thóm hỏm sinh hoạt nơi xứ người, để rồi hành xử co cụm thu hẹp trở thành nhỏ bé, đố kỵ, và hung tợn bạo ngược với lá cờ ba que đã thành tấm giẻ rách. Nhưng đám người bại trận bỏ chạy bày đủ trò vẫn cứ nhân danh tổ quốc ba que giẻ rách để thành lập một “đại công ty chính nghĩa chống cộng” chuyên phao tin đồn và nhân danh “đại nghĩa chống cộng” hung hăng đòi chỉ đạo can thiệp vào đời sống xã hội của người Việt kiều, dù càng ngày càng yếu đi sau 36 năm.

Hệ quả, trong đất nước Viêt nam một bọn bán khai bạo ngược toàn trị với thể chế độc tài tư bản phong kiến. Bên ngoài bọn tàn dư Ngụy ngục thiết lập thể chế chống cộng chuyên trị tung tin đồn và hoang tưởng.

-Nỗi buồn thứ hai, nếu có thể tách ra được, nhưng kỳ thực nó cũng chính là sự nối dài của nỗi buồn thứ nhất. Đó là sau 30-4-1975, thay vì là một cơ hội mới để xóa sổ những ngu xuẩn và hận thù giả dối để  KHỞI CÔNG XÂY DỰNG LẠI XÃ HỘI và CON NGƯỜI có cái tên hiện thể là VIỆT NAM, thì tất cả đã bắt đầu “nền hòa bình thống nhất” bằng sự TRẢ THÙ.

Sự trả thù trong chiến tranh đã là man rợ tàn độc, nhưng sự trả thù trong “hòa bình và thống nhất” thì quả thật nó đã phơi bày sự ti tiện và bạo ngược đến cùng cực của tính man di bán khai nơi con người và chế độ của đảng CSVN. Cả một nửa đất nước xã hội bị đối xử như bày nô lệ bị chiếm đóng, dĩ nhiên những cá nhân thành phần của chế độ Ngụy chắc chắn phải lãnh nhận sự trả thù này nặng nề và nhãn tiền! Tất cả con người miền Nam, kể cả một số những thành phần từng theo tập kết ra Bắc, bị tước đoạt trần truồng từ vật chất đến tinh thần, không còn một chút gì dính lại là hình dáng Con Người .

Nhà nước chính phủ thiết lập những đối sách cai trị đi từ sự ngờ vực, đố kỵ họ, sợ hãi họ, rồi soi mói rình mò họ, và trù dập đủ kiểu. Còn anh em bè bạn thân quyến, sau hơn 20 năm cách biệt, khi “đoàn tụ” lại nhẫn tâm bất lương ăn cắp hết phần còn lại, không chỉ là của cải vật chất, mà ngay chính những tình cảm con người nhỏ bé thân thuơng nhất còn xót lại sau cuộc chiến, cũng bị “đồng bào thân nhân thuộc phe chiến thắng” lưu manh trơ trẽn cuỗm đi, nhiều khi rất sống sượng, trong những ngày tháng đầu của 30-4. Và rồi tất cả người Việt Nam sau đó vài năm, họ, tất cả, bị đặt vào một thể chế, mà để tồn tại trong đó như một sinh vật, họ phải quay ra ăn cắp của nhau, lừa đảo thật sống sượng, chà đạp lên nhau thật bất nhân… không kém phần man rợ của Cải Cách Ruộng Đất là bao xa, thời kỳ mà anh em cha mẹ vợ chồng bè bạn  triệt hạ nhau phi nhân tính!

Sau 30-4 vài năm, một số lớn người Viêt Nam đi vượt biên, và sự trả thù ti tiện này họ đã không để lại nơi đất nước Viêt Nam cho cái chế độ Độc tài đảng trị, họ đem theo và vẫn tiếp tục tiến hành bởi những thằng lính, gã công chức thất trận. Chúng nó đẩy đòn thù lên gần như bất cứ ai không phủ phục chúng nó, từ trên đảo tị nạn tạm cư, cho đến khi đã định cư tại một quốc gia khác. và việc ăn cắp những niềm tin vào tình người , vào nhau, dù nhỏ bé nhất tiếp tục xảy ra, nhân danh tự do, tị nạn, và chống cộng.

(Hai người trộm chó ở làng Nhĩ Trung, xã Gio Linh, huyện Gio Linh, tỉnh Quảng Trị bị dân làng vây đánh chết. Người ta có thể vì con chó đánh chết con người thì thật đáng sợ.  Nhưng cái đáng sợ hơn, có những nơi lên tiếng “Hai cẩu tặc bị đánh chết”, tin tức đưa theo hướng ca ngợi vụ đánh chết người đó như một thắng lợi.)

Nỗi buồn cuối cùng, chẳng qua cũng là hệ quả của hai nỗi buồn trước nó, chính là sự phá sản băng hoại toàn diện nhân trí của những con người có nhãn hiệu Việt Nam. Những gì còn có thể gọi là Chân, là Thiện là Mỹ, còn sót lại trong thời chiến tranh, đặc biệt là niềm hy vọng cuối cùng không chỉ là vào “hòa bình, thống nhất,” mà vào chính phần lương tâm con người tối thiểu của nhau,  tất cả cũng đã bị hoàn toàn tiêu hủy sau 30-4. Hệ quả của nó kéo dài đến hôm nay, sau 36 năm, xã hội Việt Nam và con người Viêt Nam dù đã bị THỊ TRƯỜNG TOÀN CẦU mở tung ra, và khoác vào cho họ cái áo vật chất văn minh hoành tráng dù là giả tạo, nó càng làm lộ rõ nét bán khai vô nhân tính của toàn thể xã hội và con người. Tất cả vội vã, chen lấn, chà đạp lên nhau để gom góp và tích lũy của cải, vội vã luống cuống tiêu thụ ngây ngô  và vụng về hưởng thụ.

Trong khi đó, cũng sau 36 năm, những kẻ ra đi sống chung với văn minh và nhân bản, cũng không khá hơn, mà còn băng hoại hơn, cũng chỉ vì bám víu vào hận thù và quyền lực, vào chủ nghĩa ái quốc dân tộc, vào ấn tượng sai lệch và sai lầm của 30-4. Toàn bộ thế hệ đi trước của cả hai phe đối nghịch nhau đã tiêu diệt cơ hội hướng thiện, vươn lên của thế hệ đi sau.

Việt Nam hôm nay, đã có hàng chục ngàn, hàng trăm ngàn du học sinh, đầu tư nước ngoài, và  có  một đội ngũ khoa bảng được đào tạo từ các trường đại học hàng đầu của nhân loại, nhưng não trạng trống rỗng và bần tiện hơn, lanh vặt và lưu manh hơn, có phương pháp hơn. Bởi lớp người này chỉ dùng phương tiện khoa bảng để kiếm cơm và tìm quyền lực. Bên ngoài Viêt Nam, thế hệ thứ hai, thứ ba của những kẻ thất trận bỏ chạy và ra đi, cũng có khoảng trên dưới hàng trăm ngàn khoa bảng chuyên gia, nếu chưa muốn nói  tổng quát là con số hàng triệu có cử nhân là căn bản. Thế nhưng tòan bộ sinh hoạt tinh thần xã hội, giá trị dân sự vẫn là con số không!!!

Thế hệ cha mẹ họ, và thể chế chính trị, thật sự hay giả tạo, nếp sống xã hội của cha mẹ họ áp đặt, đã ăn cắp đi đức tính cần thiết:  đam mê kiến thức, đam mê ý nghĩa  giá trị cuộc sống trong con người của họ mất rồi. Chỉ còn lại QUYỀN và LỢI với cái triết lý ngu ngục hạ cấp “khôn chết, dại chết, biết sống.”

36 năm, dù đã quá chậm trễ để xóa sổ làm lại, nếu tính theo một đời người, một thế hệ. Nhưng với tính nối dài miên tục của một xã hội, một đất nước, và cả tiến trình nhân loại này, thì việc xóa sổ cái sai cũ để khởi đầu tiến hành cái mới tốt đẹp không bao giờ sớm, và chẳng bao giờ muộn màng hết cả. Phải xóa sổ hết những ám hữu của những định kiến cũ để khởi đầu xây dựng nhận thức về một xã hội dân sự của những con người có tên là Viêt Nam. Xây dựng sự nhận thức về chính giá trị tự thân, tức là xây dựng lại NHÂN TRÍ để kiến tạo nền DÂN TRÍ cho xã hội.

Và tất cả cũng vẫn phải khởi đầu bằng những nỗ lực từ những cá nhân đơn lẻ đi trước.  Phải can đảm và sáng suốt gác bỏ những ngăn trở do chính mình tự kỷ tạo ra.  Thể hiện rốt ráo tính liên đới trách nhiệm của cá nhân Con Người. Mảnh đất  Con Người Việt nam đang cần được vun xới bằng quả cảm kiên trì và công chính, để những hạt giống nhân bản có thể nẩy mầm, và rồi sẽ thành những cánh đồng bát ngát giá trị tự thân, nơi đó NỀN DÂN CHỦ có TỰ DO BÌNH ĐẲNG  sẽ được xây dựng vững chắc. Hạnh phúc của mỗi cá nhân, của chúng ta, và của cả nhân loại này cũng được xây dựng từ căn bản đó.

nkptc30-4-2011
NKPTC

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(cập nhật 10-12-2018) THÔNG TIN

PHỤ BẢN QUAN TRỌNG: Đây là phần phụ bản về những thông tin mới nhất liên quan đến chiến tranh Việt Nam. Những thông tin thuộc loại chấn động này đã bị dấu kín hàng bao năm sau cuộc chiến VN (1973) nhất là việc TRAO TRẢ TÙ BINH MỸ theo hiệp định đình chiến Paris 1973 mà  trong đó, theo bản tường trình và ký kết chính thức từ  cả hai phía Mỹ và Việt Cộng rằng TẤT CẢ TÙ BINH ĐÃ ĐƯỢC TRAO TRẢ ĐẦY ĐỦ. Việt Nam không lưu giữ cầm tù bất cứ lính Mỹ nào sau 1973. Nhưng sự thật đã khác hẳn! Cuộc điều tra của một số ký giả, nghiên cứu sử liệu Mỹ sau này, đặc biệt đã chứng minh với đủ chứng cớ văn bản rằng phía Việt Nam (VC) và Mỹ đều biết họ đã nói dối dân chúng về cuộc ký kết hiệp định; và sự thật rằng còn hơn  một ngàn lính Mỹ bị Việt cộng giữ lại làm con tin để sau đó đòi Mỹ trả tiền chuộc cho số tù binh này, giống như Việt cộng đã từng làm như thế với Pháp sau hiệp định Geneve 1954, và hơn nữa với hy vọng mặc cả với Mỹ về số tiền bồi thường chiến tranh…Nhưng chính phủ Mỹ đa “ngoan cố” không chi trả tiền chuộc vì sợ bẽ mặt với quần chúng nếu như số tù binh này về lại được Mỹ thì mọi việc gian dối sẽ đổ bể! Hậu quả là những tù bình này tồn tại lầm lũi nơi các trại tù Việtnam, một số chết vì bệnh tật, tra tấn, đuối sức v,v Một bị chuyển đến Sô Viết để bị khai thác….

Cho đến khi có cuộc “bình thường hóa quan hệ bang giao” giữa Mỹ và Việt Nam thì con số tù binh sống sót còn lại của hơn một ngàn tù binh “vô danh, vô thừa nhận” này bị Việt Nam đem ra hành quyết, giết sạch để bịt miệng và hủy chứng tích với sự mặc nhiên đồng tình  và làm ngơ của nhà nước Mỹ!  Mỉa mai thay, kẻ đứng đầu kế hoặc che dấu tội ác kinh tởm này của hai nhà nước chính phủ Việt Mỹ, lại là tên “anh hùng quân đội cụu tù bình- thượng nghị sĩ John McCain!

Tất cả tội ác kinh tởm này chỉ để  “giữ thể diện cho NHÀ NƯỚC CHÍNH PHỦ HAI BÊN VIỆT MỸ trong mục tiêu xóa sổ tất cả những “khúc mắc”, “chướng ngại”. và “dấu tích gian dối” cho tiến trình bình thường hóa quan hệ Việt Mỹ trong kế hoặch tái lập con đường quay lại Á Châu của Mỹ (Asia Pivot).

Trong một buổi tường trình riêng, những nhân viên cao cấp của CIA đã nói với tôi ()  rằng hàng năm trời trôi qua và số tiền bồi thường chiến tranh (tiền chuộc lính Mỹ) đã chẳng bao giờ gửi đến. Việc càng ngày càng trở nên khó khăn cho cả hai bên chính phủ muốn thú nhận rằng họ đã biết ngay từ đầu vê số tù binh (mỹ) không được ghi nhận. Những tù bình này không những đã trở thành vô dụng trong trao đổi mặc cả mà còn tạo ra mối rửi ro nguy hại cho niềm mong ước của Hà Nội (nhà nước ViệtNam) được tái nhận vào cộng đồng quốc tế. Những quan chức CIA này nói những thông tin tình báo của họ đã cho thấy rõ ràng rằng những tù binh còn sót lại này- những người chưa chết vì bệnh tật hoặc lao lực hay tra tấn- cuối cùng đã  bị hành quyết! (In a private briefing in 1992, high-level CIA officials told me that as the years passed and the ransom never came, it became more and more difficult for either government to admit that it knew from the start about the unacknowledged prisoners. Those prisoners had not only become useless as bargaining chips but also posed a risk to Hanoi’s desire to be accepted into the international community. The CIA officials said their intelligence indicated strongly that the remaining men—those who had not died from illness or hard labor or torture—were eventually executed)

Dưới đây là một số các tư liệu thông tin liên quan do ký giả điều tra và nhà nghiên cúu

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John McCain and the POW Cover-Up- The “war hero” candidate buried information about POWs left behind in Vietnam.

Eighteen months ago, TAC publisher Ron Unz discovered an astonishing account of the role the 2008 Republican presidential nominee, John McCain, had played in suppressing information about what happened to American soldiers missing in action in Vietnam. Below, we present in full Sydney Schanberg’s explosive story. 

John McCain, who has risen to political prominence on his image as a Vietnam POW war hero, has, inexplicably, worked very hard to hide from the public stunning information about American prisoners in Vietnam who, unlike him, didn’t return home. Throughout his Senate career, McCain has quietly sponsored and pushed into federal law a set of prohibitions that keep the most revealing information about these men buried as classified documents. Thus the war hero who people would logically imagine as a determined crusader for the interests of POWs and their families became instead the strange champion of hiding the evidence and closing the books.

Almost as striking is the manner in which the mainstream press has shied from reporting the POW story and McCain’s role in it, even as the Republican Party has made McCain’s military service the focus of his presidential campaign. Reporters who had covered the Vietnam War turned their heads and walked in other directions. McCain doesn’t talk about the missing men, and the press never asks him about them.

The sum of the secrets McCain has sought to hide is not small. There exists a telling mass of official documents, radio intercepts, witness depositions, satellite photos of rescue symbols that pilots were trained to use, electronic messages from the ground containing the individual code numbers given to airmen, a rescue mission by a special forces unit that was aborted twice by Washington—and even sworn testimony by two Defense secretaries that “men were left behind.” This imposing body of evidence suggests that a large number—the documents indicate probably hundreds—of the U.S. prisoners held by Vietnam were not returned when the peace treaty was signed in January 1973 and Hanoi released 591 men, among them Navy combat pilot John S. McCain.

Mass of Evidence

The Pentagon had been withholding significant information from POW families for years. What’s more, the Pentagon’s POW/MIA operation had been publicly shamed by internal whistleblowers and POW families for holding back documents as part of a policy of “debunking” POW intelligence even when the information was obviously credible.

The pressure from the families and Vietnam veterans finally forced the creation, in late 1991, of a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The chairman was John Kerry. McCain, as a former POW, was its most pivotal member. In the end, the committee became part of the debunking machine.

One of the sharpest critics of the Pentagon’s performance was an insider, Air Force Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, who headed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) during the 1970s. He openly challenged the Pentagon’s position that no live prisoners existed, saying that the evidence proved otherwise. McCain was a bitter opponent of Tighe, who was eventually pushed into retirement.

Included in the evidence that McCain and his government allies suppressed or sought to discredit is a transcript of a senior North Vietnamese general’s briefing of the Hanoi politburo, discovered in Soviet archives by an American scholar in 1993. The briefing took place only four months before the 1973 peace accords. The general, Tran Van Quang, told the politburo members that Hanoi was holding 1,205 American prisoners but would keep many of them at war’s end as leverage to ensure getting war reparations from Washington.

Throughout the Paris negotiations, the North Vietnamese tied the prisoner issue tightly to the issue of reparations. They were adamant in refusing to deal with them separately. Finally, in a Feb. 2, 1973 formal letter to Hanoi’s premier, Pham Van Dong, Nixon pledged $3.25 billion in “postwar reconstruction” aid “without any political conditions.” But he also attached to the letter a codicil that said the aid would be implemented by each party “in accordance with its own constitutional provisions.” That meant Congress would have to approve the appropriation, and Nixon and Kissinger knew well that Congress was in no mood to do so. The North Vietnamese, whether or not they immediately understood the double-talk in the letter, remained skeptical about the reparations promise being honored—and it never was. Hanoi thus appears to have held back prisoners—just as it had done when the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and withdrew their forces from Vietnam. In that case, France paid ransoms for prisoners and brought them home.

In a private briefing in 1992, high-level CIA officials told me that as the years passed and the ransom never came, it became more and more difficult for either government to admit that it knew from the start about the unacknowledged prisoners. Those prisoners had not only become useless as bargaining chips but also posed a risk to Hanoi’s desire to be accepted into the international community. The CIA officials said their intelligence indicated strongly that the remaining men—those who had not died from illness or hard labor or torture—were eventually executed.

My own research, detailed below, has convinced me that it is not likely that more than a few—if any—are alive in captivity today. (That CIA briefing at the Agency’s Langley, Virginia, headquarters was conducted “off the record,” but because the evidence from my own reporting since then has brought me to the same conclusion, I felt there was no longer any point in not writing about the meeting.)

For many reasons, including the absence of a political constituency for the missing men other than their families and some veterans’ groups, very few Americans are aware of the POW story and of McCain’s role in keeping it out of public view and denying the existence of abandoned POWs. That is because McCain has hardly been alone in his campaign to hide the scandal.

The Arizona senator, now the Republican candidate for president, has actually been following the lead of every White House since Richard Nixon’s, and thus of every CIA director, Pentagon chief, and national security adviser, not to mention Dick Cheney, who was George H.W. Bush’s Defense secretary. Their biggest accomplice has been an indolent press, particularly in Washington.

McCain’s Role

An early and critical McCain secrecy move involved 1990 legislation that started in the House of Representatives. A brief and simple document, it was called “the Truth Bill” and would have compelled complete transparency about prisoners and missing men. Its core sentence reads: “[The] head of each department or agency which holds or receives any records and information, including live-sighting reports, which have been correlated or possibly correlated to United States personnel listed as prisoner of war or missing in action from World War II, the Korean conflict and the Vietnam conflict, shall make available to the public all such records held or received by that department or agency.”

Bitterly opposed by the Pentagon (and thus McCain), the bill went nowhere. Reintroduced the following year, it again disappeared. But a few months later, a new measure, known as “the McCain Bill,” suddenly appeared. By creating a bureaucratic maze from which only a fraction of the documents could emerge—only records that revealed no POW secrets—it turned the Truth Bill on its head. The McCain bill became law in 1991 and remains so today. So crushing to transparency are its provisions that it actually spells out for the Pentagon and other agencies several rationales, scenarios, and justifications for not releasing any information at all—even about prisoners discovered alive in captivity. Later that year, the Senate Select Committee was created, where Kerry and McCain ultimately worked together to bury evidence.

McCain was also instrumental in amending the Missing Service Personnel Act, which had been strengthened in 1995 by POW advocates to include criminal penalties, saying, “Any government official who knowingly and willfully withholds from the file of a missing person any information relating to the disappearance or whereabouts and status of a missing person shall be fined as provided in Title 18 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.” A year later, in a closed House-Senate conference on an unrelated military bill, McCain, at the behest of the Pentagon, attached a crippling amendment to the act, stripping out its only enforcement teeth, the criminal penalties, and reducing the obligations of commanders in the field to speedily search for missing men and to report the incidents to the Pentagon.

About the relaxation of POW/MIA obligations on commanders in the field, a public McCain memo said, “This transfers the bureaucracy involved out of the [battle] field to Washington.” He wrote that the original legislation, if left intact, “would accomplish nothing but create new jobs for lawyers and turn military commanders into clerks.”

McCain argued that keeping the criminal penalties would have made it impossible for the Pentagon to find staffers willing to work on POW/MIA matters. That’s an odd argument to make. Were staffers only “willing to work” if they were allowed to conceal POW records? By eviscerating the law, McCain gave his stamp of approval to the government policy of debunking the existence of live POWs.

McCain has insisted again and again that all the evidence—documents, witnesses, satellite photos, two Pentagon chiefs’ sworn testimony, aborted rescue missions, ransom offers apparently scorned—has been woven together by unscrupulous deceivers to create an insidious and unpatriotic myth. He calls it the “bizarre rantings of the MIA hobbyists.” He has regularly vilified those who keep trying to pry out classified documents as “hoaxers,” “charlatans,” “conspiracy theorists,” and “dime-store Rambos.”

Some of McCain’s fellow captives at Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi didn’t share his views about prisoners left behind. Before he died of leukemia in 1999, retired Col. Ted Guy, a highly admired POW and one of the most dogged resisters in the camps, wrote an angry open letter to the senator in an MIA newsletter—a response to McCain’s stream of insults hurled at MIA activists. Guy wrote, “John, does this [the insults] include Senator Bob Smith [a New Hampshire Republican and activist on POW issues] and other concerned elected officials? Does this include the families of the missing where there is overwhelming evidence that their loved ones were ‘last known alive’? Does this include some of your fellow POWs?”

It’s not clear whether the taped confession McCain gave to his captors to avoid further torture has played a role in his postwar behavior in the Senate. That confession was played endlessly over the prison loudspeaker system at Hoa Lo—to try to break down other prisoners—and was broadcast over Hanoi’s state radio. Reportedly, he confessed to being a war criminal who had bombed civilian targets. The Pentagon has a copy of the confession but will not release it. Also, no outsider I know of has ever seen a non-redacted copy of the debriefing of McCain when he returned from captivity, which is classified but could be made public by McCain.

All humans have breaking points. Many men undergoing torture give confessions, often telling huge lies so their fakery will be understood by their comrades and their country. Few will fault them. But it was McCain who apparently felt he had disgraced himself and his military family. His father, John S. McCain II, was a highly regarded rear admiral then serving as commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific. His grandfather was also a rear admiral.

In his bestselling 1999 autobiography, Faith of My Fathers, McCain says he felt bad throughout his captivity because he knew he was being treated more leniently than his fellow POWs, owing to his high-ranking father and thus his propaganda value. Other prisoners at Hoa Lo say his captors considered him a prize catch and called him the “Crown Prince,” something McCain acknowledges in the book.

Also in this memoir, McCain expresses guilt at having broken under torture and given the confession. “I felt faithless and couldn’t control my despair,” he writes, revealing that he made two “feeble” attempts at suicide. (In later years, he said he tried to hang himself with his shirt and guards intervened.) Tellingly, he says he lived in “dread” that his father would find out about the confession. “I still wince,” he writes, “when I recall wondering if my father had heard of my disgrace.”

He says that when he returned home, he told his father about the confession, but “never discussed it at length”—and the admiral, who died in 1981, didn’t indicate he had heard anything about it before. But he had. In the 1999 memoir, the senator writes, “I only recently learned that the tape … had been broadcast outside the prison and had come to the attention of my father.”

Is McCain haunted by these memories? Does he suppress POW information because its surfacing would rekindle his feelings of shame? On this subject, all I have are questions.

Many stories have been written about McCain’s explosive temper, so volcanic that colleagues are loath to speak openly about it. One veteran congressman who has observed him over the years asked for confidentiality and made this brief comment: “This is a man not at peace with himself.”

He was certainly far from calm on the Senate POW committee. He browbeat expert witnesses who came with information about unreturned POWs. Family members who have personally faced McCain and pressed him to end the secrecy also have been treated to his legendary temper. He has screamed at them, insulted them, brought women to tears. Mostly his responses to them have been versions of: How dare you question my patriotism? In 1996, he roughly pushed aside a group of POW family members who had waited outside a hearing room to appeal to him, including a mother in a wheelchair.

But even without answers to what may be hidden in the recesses of McCain’s mind, one thing about the POW story is clear: if American prisoners were dishonored by being written off and left to die, that’s something the American public ought to know about.

10 Key Pieces of Evidence That Men Were Left Behind

1. In Paris, where the Vietnam peace treaty was negotiated, the United States asked Hanoi for the list of American prisoners to be returned, fearing that Hanoi would hold some prisoners back. The North Vietnamese refused, saying they would produce the list only after the treaty was signed. Nixon agreed with Kissinger that they had no leverage left, and Kissinger signed the accord on Jan. 27, 1973 without the prisoner list. When Hanoi produced its list of 591 prisoners the next day, U.S. intelligence agencies expressed shock at the low number. Their number was hundreds higher. The New York Times published a long, page-one story on Feb. 2, 1973 about the discrepancy, especially raising questions about the number of prisoners held in Laos, only nine of whom were being returned. The headline read, in part, “Laos POW List Shows 9 from U.S.—Document Disappointing to Washington as 311 Were Believed Missing.” And the story, by John Finney, said that other Washington officials “believe the number of prisoners [in Laos] is probably substantially higher.” The paper never followed up with any serious investigative reporting—nor did any other mainstream news organization.

2. Two Defense secretaries who served during the Vietnam War testified to the Senate POW committee in September 1992 that prisoners were not returned. James Schlesinger and Melvin Laird, both speaking at a public session and under oath, said they based their conclusions on strong intelligence data—letters, eyewitness reports, even direct radio contacts. Under questioning, Schlesinger chose his words carefully, understanding clearly the volatility of the issue: “I think that as of now that I can come to no other conclusion … some were left behind.” This ran counter to what President Nixon told the public in a nationally televised speech on March 29, 1973, when the repatriation of the 591 was in motion: “Tonight,” Nixon said, “the day we have all worked and prayed for has finally come. For the first time in 12 years, no American military forces are in Vietnam. All our American POWs are on their way home.” Documents unearthed since then show that aides had already briefed Nixon about the contrary evidence.

Schlesinger was asked by the Senate committee for his explanation of why President Nixon would have made such a statement when he knew Hanoi was still holding prisoners. He replied, “One must assume that we had concluded that the bargaining position of the United States … was quite weak. We were anxious to get our troops out and we were not going to roil the waters…” This testimony struck me as a bombshell. The New York Times appropriately reported it on page one but again there was no sustained follow-up by the Times or any other major paper or national news outlet.

3. Over the years, the DIA received more than 1,600 first-hand sightings of live American prisoners and nearly 14,000 second-hand reports. Many witnesses interrogated by CIA or Pentagon intelligence agents were deemed “credible” in the agents’ reports. Some of the witnesses were given lie-detector tests and passed. Sources provided me with copies of these witness reports, which are impressive in their detail. A lot of the sightings described a secondary tier of prison camps many miles from Hanoi. Yet the DIA, after reviewing all these reports, concluded that they “do not constitute evidence” that men were alive.

4. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, listening stations picked up messages in which Laotian military personnel spoke about moving American prisoners from one labor camp to another. These listening posts were manned by Thai communications officers trained by the National Security Agency (NSA), which monitors signals worldwide. The NSA teams had moved out after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and passed the job to the Thai allies. But when the Thais turned these messages over to Washington, the intelligence community ruled that since the intercepts were made by a “third party”—namely Thailand—they could not be regarded as authentic. That’s some Catch-22: the U.S. trained a third party to take over its role in monitoring signals about POWs, but because that third party did the monitoring, the messages weren’t valid.

Here, from CIA files, is an example that clearly exposes the farce. On Dec. 27, 1980, a Thai military signal team picked up a message saying that prisoners were being moved out of Attopeu (in southern Laos) by aircraft “at 1230 hours.” Three days later a message was sent from the CIA station in Bangkok to the CIA director’s office in Langley. It read, in part: “The prisoners … are now in the valley in permanent location (a prison camp at Nhommarath in Central Laos). They were transferred from Attopeu to work in various places … POWs were formerly kept in caves and are very thin, dark and starving.” Apparently the prisoners were real. But the transmission was declared “invalid” by Washington because the information came from a “third party” and thus could not be deemed credible.

5. A series of what appeared to be distress signals from Vietnam and Laos were captured by the government’s satellite system in the late 1980s and early ’90s. (Before that period, no search for such signals had been put in place.) Not a single one of these markings was ever deemed credible. To the layman’s eye, the satellite photos, some of which I’ve seen, show markings on the ground that are identical to the signals that American pilots had been specifically trained to use in their survival courses—such as certain letters, like X or K, drawn in a special way. Other markings were the secret four-digit authenticator numbers given to individual pilots. But time and again, the Pentagon, backed by the CIA, insisted that humans had not made these markings. What were they, then? “Shadows and vegetation,” the government said, insisting that the markings were merely normal topographical contours like saw-grass or rice-paddy divider walls. It was the automatic response—shadows and vegetation. On one occasion, a Pentagon photo expert refused to go along. It was a missing man’s name gouged into a field, he said, not trampled grass or paddy berms. His bosses responded by bringing in an outside contractor who found instead, yes, shadows and vegetation. This refrain led Bob Taylor, a highly regarded investigator on the Senate committee staff who had examined the photographic evidence, to comment to me: “If grass can spell out people’s names and secret digit codes, then I have a newfound respect for grass.”

6. On Nov. 11, 1992, Dolores Alfond, the sister of missing airman Capt. Victor Apodaca and chair of the National Alliance of Families, an organization of relatives of POW/MIAs, testified at one of the Senate committee’s public hearings. She asked for information about data the government had gathered from electronic devices used in a classified program known as PAVE SPIKE.

The devices were motion sensors, dropped by air, designed to pick up enemy troop movements. Shaped on one end like a spike with an electronic pod and antenna on top, they were designed to stick in the ground as they fell. Air Force planes would drop them along the Ho Chi Minh trail and other supply routes. The devices, though primarily sensors, also had rescue capabilities. Someone on the ground—a downed airman or a prisoner on a labor gang —could manually enter data into the sensor. All data were regularly collected electronically by U.S. planes flying overhead. Alfond stated, without any challenge or contradiction by the committee, that in 1974, a year after the supposedly complete return of prisoners, the gathered data showed that a person or people had manually entered into the sensors—as U.S. pilots had been trained to do—no less than 20 authenticator numbers that corresponded exactly to the classified authenticator numbers of 20 U.S. POWs who were lost in Laos. Alfond added, according to the transcript, “This PAVE SPIKE intelligence is seamless, but the committee has not discussed it or released what it knows about PAVE SPIKE.”

McCain attended that committee hearing specifically to confront Alfond because of her criticism of the panel’s work. He bellowed and berated her for quite a while. His face turning anger-pink, he accused her of “denigrating” his “patriotism.” The bullying had its effect—she began to cry.

After a pause Alfond recovered and tried to respond to his scorching tirade, but McCain simply turned away and stormed out of the room. The PAVE SPIKE file has never been declassified. We still don’t know anything about those 20 POWs.

7. As previously mentioned, in April 1993 in a Moscow archive, a researcher from Harvard, Stephen Morris, unearthed and made public the transcript of a briefing that General Tran Van Quang gave to the Hanoi politburo four months before the signing of the Paris peace accords in 1973.

In the transcript, General Quang told the Hanoi politburo that 1,205 U.S. prisoners were being held. Quang said that many of the prisoners would be held back from Washington after the accords as bargaining chips for war reparations. General Quang’s report added: “This is a big number. Officially, until now, we published a list of only 368 prisoners of war. The rest we have not revealed. The government of the USA knows this well, but it does not know the exact number … and can only make guesses based on its losses. That is why we are keeping the number of prisoners of war secret, in accordance with the politburo’s instructions.” The report then went on to explain in clear and specific language that a large number would be kept back to ensure reparations.

The reaction to the document was immediate. After two decades of denying it had kept any prisoners, Hanoi responded to the revelation by calling the transcript a fabrication.

Similarly, Washington—which had over the same two decades refused to recant Nixon’s declaration that all the prisoners had been returned—also shifted into denial mode. The Pentagon issued a statement saying the document “is replete with errors, omissions and propaganda that seriously damage its credibility,” and that the numbers were “inconsistent with our own accounting.”

Neither American nor Vietnamese officials offered any rationale for who would plant a forged document in the Soviet archives and why they would do so. Certainly neither Washington nor Moscow—closely allied with Hanoi—would have any motive, since the contents were embarrassing to all parties, and since both the United States and Vietnam had consistently denied the existence of unreturned prisoners. The Russian archivists simply said the document was “authentic.”

8. In his 2002 book, Inside Delta Force, retired Command Sgt. Maj. Eric Haney described how in 1981 his special forces unit, after rigorous training for a POW rescue mission, had the mission suddenly aborted, revived a year later, and again abruptly aborted. Haney writes that this abandonment of captured soldiers ate at him for years and left him disillusioned about his government’s vows to leave no men behind. “Years later, I spoke at length with a former highly placed member of the North Vietnamese diplomatic corps, and this person asked me point-blank: ‘Why did the Americans never attempt to recover their remaining POWs after the conclusion of the war?’” Haney writes. He continued, saying that he came to believe senior government officials had called off those missions in 1981 and 1982. (His account is on pages 314 to 321 of my paperback copy of the book.)

9. There is also evidence that in the first months of Ronald Reagan’s presidency in 1981, the White House received a ransom proposal for a number of POWs being held by Hanoi in Indochina. The offer, which was passed to Washington from an official of a third country, was apparently discussed at a meeting in the Roosevelt Room attended by Reagan, Vice President Bush, CIA director William Casey, and National Security Adviser Richard Allen. Allen confirmed the offer in sworn testimony to the Senate POW committee on June 23, 1992.

Allen was allowed to testify behind closed doors and no information was released. But a San Diego Union-Tribune reporter, Robert Caldwell, obtained the portion relating to the ransom offer and reported on it. The ransom request was for $4 billion, Allen testified. He said he told Reagan that “it would be worth the president’s going along and let’s have the negotiation.” When his testimony appeared in the Union-Tribune, Allen quickly wrote a letter to the panel, this time not under oath, recanting the ransom story and claiming his memory had played tricks on him. His new version was that some POW activists had asked him about such an offer in a meeting that took place in 1986, when he was no longer in government. “It appears,” he said in the letter, “that there never was a 1981 meeting about the return of POW/MIAs for $4 billion.”

But the episode didn’t end there. A Treasury agent on Secret Service duty in the White House, John Syphrit, came forward to say he had overheard part of the ransom conversation in the Roosevelt Room in 1981, when the offer was discussed by Reagan, Bush, Casey, Allen, and other cabinet officials.

Syphrit, a veteran of the Vietnam War, told the committee he was willing to testify, but they would have to subpoena him. Treasury opposed his appearance, arguing that voluntary testimony would violate the trust between the Secret Service and those it protects. It was clear that coming in on his own could cost Syphrit his career. The committee voted 7 to 4 not to subpoena him.

In the committee’s final report, dated Jan. 13, 1993 (on page 284), the panel not only chastised Syphrit for his failure to testify without a subpoena (“The committee regrets that the Secret Service agent was unwilling …”), but noted that since Allen had recanted his testimony about the Roosevelt Room briefing, Syphrit’s testimony would have been “at best, uncorroborated by the testimony of any other witness.” The committee omitted any mention that it had made a decision not to ask the other two surviving witnesses, Bush and Reagan, to give testimony under oath. (Casey had died.)

10. In 1990, Col. Millard Peck, a decorated infantry veteran of Vietnam then working at the DIA as chief of the Asia Division for Current Intelligence, asked for the job of chief of the DIA’s Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. His reason for seeking the transfer, which was not a promotion, was that he had heard from officials throughout the Pentagon that the POW/MIA office had been turned into a waste-disposal unit for getting rid of unwanted evidence about live prisoners—a “black hole,” these officials called it.

Peck explained all this in his telling resignation letter of Feb. 12, 1991, eight months after he had taken the job. He said he viewed it as “sort of a holy crusade” to restore the integrity of the office but was defeated by the Pentagon machine. The four-page, single-spaced letter was scathing, describing the putative search for missing men as “a cover-up.”

Peck charged that, at its top echelons, the Pentagon had embraced a “mind-set to debunk” all evidence of prisoners left behind. “That national leaders continue to address the prisoner of war and missing in action issue as the ‘highest national priority,’ is a travesty,” he wrote. “The entire charade does not appear to be an honest effort, and may never have been. … Practically all analysis is directed to finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any effective, active follow through on any of the sightings, nor is there a responsive ‘action arm’ to routinely and aggressively pursue leads.”

“I became painfully aware,” his letter continued, “that I was not really in charge of my own office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger and totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA … I feel strongly that this issue is being manipulated and controlled at a higher level, not with the goal of resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners and give the illusion of progress through hyperactivity.” He named no names but said these players are “unscrupulous people in the Government or associated with the Government” who “have maintained their distance and remained hidden in the shadows, while using the [POW] Office as a ‘toxic waste dump’ to bury the whole ‘mess’ out of sight.” Peck added that “military officers … who in some manner have ‘rocked the boat’ [have] quickly come to grief.”

Peck concluded, “From what I have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than political legerdemain done with ‘smoke and mirrors’ to stall the issue until it dies a natural death.”

The disillusioned colonel not only resigned but asked to be retired immediately from active military service. The press never followed up.

My Pursuit of the Story

I covered the war in Cambodia and Vietnam, but came to the POW information only slowly afterward, when military officers I knew from that conflict began coming to me with maps and POW sightings and depositions by Vietnamese witnesses.

I was then city editor of the New York Times, no longer involved in foreign or national stories, so I took the data to the appropriate desks and suggested it was material worth pursuing. There were no takers. Some years later, in 1991, when I was an op-ed columnist at Newsday, the aforementioned special Senate committee was formed to probe the POW issue. I saw this as an opening and immersed myself in the reporting.

At Newsday, I wrote 36 columns over a two-year period, as well as a four-part series on a trip I took to North Vietnam to report on what happened to one missing pilot who was shot down over the Ho Chi Minh trail and captured when he parachuted down. After Newsday, I wrote thousands more words on the subject for other outlets. Some of the pieces were about McCain’s key role.

Though I wrote on many subjects for Life, Vanity Fair, and Washington Monthly, my POW articles appeared in Penthouse, the Village Voice, and APBnews.com. Mainstream publications just weren’t interested. Their disinterest was part of what motivated me, and I became one of a very short list of journalists who considered the story important.

Serving in the Army in Germany during the Cold War and witnessing combat firsthand as a reporter in India and Indochina led me to have great respect for those who fight for their country. To my mind, we dishonored U.S. troops when our government failed to bring them home from Vietnam after the 591 others were released—and then claimed they didn’t exist. And politicians dishonor themselves when they pay lip service to the bravery and sacrifice of soldiers only to leave untold numbers behind, rationalizing to themselves that it’s merely one of the unfortunate costs of war.

John McCain—now campaigning for the White House as a war hero, maverick, and straight shooter—owes the voters some explanations. The press were long ago wooed and won by McCain’s seeming openness, Lone Ranger pose, and self-deprecating humor, which may partly explain their ignoring his record on POWs. In the numerous, lengthy McCain profiles that have appeared of late in papers like the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal, I may have missed a clause or a sentence along the way, but I have not found a single mention of his role in burying information about POWs. Television and radio news programs have been similarly silent.

Reporters simply never ask him about it. They didn’t when he ran unsuccessfully for the Republican nomination in 2000. They haven’t now, despite the fact that we’re in the midst of another war—a war he supports and one that has echoes of Vietnam. The only explanation McCain has ever offered for his leadership on legislation that seals POW files is that he believes the release of such information would only stir up fresh grief for the families of those who were never accounted for in Vietnam. Of the scores of POW families I’ve met over the years, only a few have said they want the books closed without knowing what happened to their men. All the rest say that not knowing is exactly what grieves them.

Isn’t it possible that what really worries those intent on keeping the POW documents buried is the public disgust that the contents of those files would generate?

How the Senate Committee Perpetuated the Debunking

In its early months, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs gave the appearance of being committed to finding out the truth about the MIAs. As time went on, however, it became clear that they were cooperating in every way with the Pentagon and CIA, who often seemed to be calling the shots, even setting the agendas for certain key hearings. Both agencies held back the most important POW files. Dick Cheney was the Pentagon chief then; Robert Gates, now the Pentagon chief, was the CIA director.

Further, the committee failed to question any living president. Reagan declined to answer questions; the committee didn’t contest his refusal. Nixon was given a pass. George H.W. Bush, the sitting president, whose prints were all over this issue from his days as CIA chief in the 1970s, was never even approached. Troubled by these signs, several committee staffers began asking why the agencies they should be probing had been turned into committee partners and decision makers. Memos to that effect were circulated. The staff made the following finding, using intelligence reports marked “credible” that covered POW sightings through 1989: “There can be no doubt that POWs were alive … as late as 1989.” That finding was never released. Eventually, much of the staff was in rebellion.

This internecine struggle continued right up to the committee’s last official act—the issuance of its final report. The Executive Summary, which comprised the first 43 pages, was essentially a whitewash, saying that only “a small number” of POWs could have been left behind in 1973 and that there was little likelihood that any prisoners could still be alive. The Washington press corps, judging from its coverage, seems to have read only this air-brushed summary, which had been closely controlled.

But the rest of the 1,221-page Report on POW/MIAs was quite different. Sprinkled throughout are pieces of hard evidence that directly contradict the summary’s conclusions. This documentation established that a significant number of prisoners were left behind—and that top government officials knew this from the start. These candid findings were inserted by committee staffers who had unearthed the evidence and were determined not to allow the truth to be sugar-coated.

If the Washington press corps did actually read the body of the report and then failed to report its contents, that would be a scandal of its own. The press would then have knowingly ignored the steady stream of findings in the body of the report that refuted the summary and indicated that the number of abandoned men was not small but considerable. The report gave no figures but estimates from various branches of the intelligence community ranged up to 600. The lowest estimate was 150.

Highlights of the report that undermine the benign conclusions of the Executive Summary:

Pages 207-209: These three pages contain revelations of what appear to be either massive intelligence failures or bad intentions—or both. The report says that until the committee brought up the subject in 1992, no branch of the intelligence community that dealt with analysis of satellite and lower-altitude photos had ever been informed of the specific distress signals U.S. personnel were trained to use in the Vietnam War, nor had they ever been tasked to look for any such signals at all from possible prisoners on the ground.

The committee decided, however, not to seek a review of old photography, saying it “would cause the expenditure of large amounts of manpower and money with no expectation of success.” It might also have turned up lots of distress-signal numbers that nobody in the government was looking for from 1973 to 1991, when the committee opened shop. That would have made it impossible for the committee to write the Executive Summary it seemed determined to write.

The failure gets worse. The committee also discovered that the DIA, which kept the lists of authenticator numbers for pilots and other personnel, could not “locate” the lists of these codes for Army, Navy, or Marine pilots. They had lost or destroyed the records. The Air Force list was the only one intact, as it had been preserved by a different intelligence branch.

The report concluded, “In theory, therefore, if a POW still living in captivity [today], were to attempt to communicate by ground signal, smuggling out a note or by whatever means possible, and he used his personal authenticator number to confirm his identity, the U.S. government would be unable to provide such confirmation, if his number happened to be among those numbers DIA cannot locate.”

It’s worth remembering that throughout the period when this intelligence disaster occurred—from the moment the treaty was signed in 1973 until 1991—the White House told the public that it had given the search for POWs and POW information the “highest national priority.”

Page 13: Even in the Executive Summary, the report acknowledges the existence of clear intelligence, made known to government officials early on, that important numbers of captured U.S. POWs were not on Hanoi’s repatriation list. After Hanoi released its list (showing only ten names from Laos—nine military men and one civilian), President Nixon sent a message on Feb. 2, 1973 to Hanoi’s Prime Minister Pham Van Dong saying, “U.S. records show there are 317 American military men unaccounted for in Laos and it is inconceivable that only ten of these men would be held prisoner in Laos.”

Nixon was right. It was inconceivable. Then why did the president, less than two months later, on March 29, 1973, announce on national television that “all of our American POWs are on their way home”?

On April 13, 1973, just after all 591 men on Hanoi’s official list had returned to American soil, the Pentagon got into step with the president and announced that there was no evidence of any further live prisoners in Indochina (this is on page 248).

Page 91: A lengthy footnote provides more confirmation of the White House’s knowledge of abandoned POWs. The footnote reads, “In a telephone conversation with Select Committee Vice-Chairman Bob Smith on December 29, 1992, Dr. Kissinger said that he had informed President Nixon during the 60-day period after the peace agreement was signed that U.S. intelligence officials believed that the list of prisoners captured in Laos was incomplete. According to Dr. Kissinger, the President responded by directing that the exchange of prisoners on the lists go forward, but added that a failure to account for the additional prisoners after Operation Homecoming would lead to a resumption of bombing. Dr. Kissinger said that the President was later unwilling to carry through on this threat.”

When Kissinger learned of the footnote while the final editing of the committee report was in progress,he and his lawyers lobbied fiercely through two Republican allies on the panel—one of them was John McCain—to get the footnote expunged. The effort failed. The footnote stayed intact.

Pages 85-86: The committee report quotes Kissinger from his memoirs, writing solely in reference to prisoners in Laos: “We knew of at least 80 instances in which an American serviceman had been captured alive and subsequently disappeared. The evidence consisted either of voice communications from the ground in advance of capture or photographs and names published by the Communists. Yet none of these men was on the list of POWs handed over after the Agreement.”

Then why did he swear under oath to the committee in 1992 that he never had any information that specific, named soldiers were captured alive and hadn’t been returned by Vietnam?

Page 89: In the middle of the prisoner repatriation and U.S. troop-withdrawal process agreed to in the treaty, when it became clear that Hanoi was not releasing everyone it held, a furious chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas Moorer, issued an order halting the troop withdrawal until Hanoi complied with the agreement. He cited in particular the known prisoners in Laos. The order was retracted by President Nixon the next day. In 1992, Moorer, by then retired, testified under oath to the committee that his order had received the approval of the president, the national security adviser, and the secretary of Defense. Nixon, however, in a letter to the committee, wrote, “I do not recall directing Admiral Moorer to send this cable.”

The report did not include the following information: behind closed doors, a senior intelligence officer had testified to the POW committee that when Moorer’s order was rescinded, the angry admiral sent a “back-channel” message to other key military commanders telling them that Washington was abandoning known live prisoners. “Nixon and Kissinger are at it again,” he wrote. “SecDef and SecState have been cut out of the loop.” In 1973, the witness was working in the office that processed this message. His name and his testimony are still classified. A source present for the testimony provided me with this information and also reported that in that same time period, Moorer had stormed into Defense Secretary Schlesinger’s office and, pounding on his desk, yelled: “The bastards have still got our men.” Schlesinger, in his own testimony to the committee a few months later, was asked about—and corroborated—this account.

Pages 95-96: In early April 1973, Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements “summoned” Dr. Roger Shields, then head of the Pentagon’s POW/MIA Task Force, to his office to work out “a new public formulation” of the POW issue; now that the White House had declared all prisoners to have been returned, a new spin was needed. Shields, under oath, described the meeting to the committee. He said Clements told him, “All the American POWs are dead.” Shields said he replied: “You can’t say that.” Clements shot back: “You didn’t hear me. They are all dead.” Shields testified that at that moment he thought he was going to be fired, but he escaped from his boss’s office still holding his job.

Pages 97-98: A couple of days later, on April 11, 1973, a day before Shields was to hold a Pentagon press conference on POWs, he and Gen. Brent Scowcroft, then the deputy national security adviser, went to the Oval Office to discuss the “new public formulation” and its presentation with President Nixon.

The next day, reporters right off asked Shields about missing POWs. Shields fudged his answers. He said, “We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive in Indochina.” But he went on to say that there had not been “a complete accounting” of those lost in Laos and that the Pentagon would press on to account for the missing—a seeming acknowledgement that some Americans were still alive and unaccounted for.

The press, however, seized on Shields’s denials. One headline read, “POW Unit Boss: No Living GIs Left in Indochina.”

Page 97: The POW committee, knowing that Nixon taped all his meetings in the Oval Office, sought the tape of that April 11, 1973 Nixon-Shields-Scowcroft meeting to find out what Nixon had been told and what he had said about the evidence of POWs still in Indochina. The committee also knew there had been other White House meetings that centered on intelligence about live POWs. A footnote on page 97 states that Nixon’s lawyers said they would provide access to the April 11 tape “only if the Committee agreed not to seek any other White House recordings from this time period.” The footnote says that the committee rejected these terms and got nothing. The committee never made public this request for Nixon tapes until the brief footnote in its 1993 report.

McCain’s Catch-22

None of this compelling evidence in the committee’s full report dislodged McCain from his contention that the whole POW issue was a concoction by deluded purveyors of a “conspiracy theory.” But an honest review of the full report, combined with the other documentary evidence, tells the story of a frustrated and angry president, and his national security adviser, furious at being thwarted at the peace table by a small, much less powerful country that refused to bow to Washington’s terms. That president seems to have swallowed hard and accepted a treaty that left probably hundreds of American prisoners in Hanoi’s hands, to be used as bargaining chips for reparations.

Maybe Nixon and Kissinger told themselves that they could get the prisoners home after some time had passed. But perhaps it proved too hard to undo a lie as big as this one. Washington said no prisoners were left behind, and Hanoi swore it had returned all of them. How could either side later admit it had lied? Time went by and as neither side budged, telling the truth became even more difficult and remote. The public would realize that Washington knew of the abandoned men all along. The truth, after men had been languishing in foul prison cells, could get people impeached or thrown in jail.

Which brings us to today, when the Republican candidate for president is the contemporary politician most responsible for keeping the truth about this matter hidden. Yet he says he’s the right man to be the commander in chief, and his credibility in making this claim is largely based on his image as a POW hero.

On page 468 of the 1,221-page report, McCain parsed his POW position oddly, “We found no compelling evidence to prove that Americans are alive in captivity today. There is some evidence—though no proof—to suggest only the possibility that a few Americans may have been kept behind after the end of America’s military involvement in Vietnam.”

“Evidence though no proof.” Clearly, no one could meet McCain’s standard of proof as long as he is leading a government crusade to keep the truth buried.

To this reporter, this sounds like a significant story and a long overdue opportunity for the press to finally dig into the archives to set the historical record straight—and even pose some direct questions to the candidate.

Sydney Schanberg has been a journalist for nearly 50 years. The 1984 movie “The Killing Fields,” which won several Academy Awards, was based on his book The Death and Life of Dith Pran. In 1975, Schanberg was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting “at great risk.” He is also the recipient of two George Polk awards, two Overseas Press Club awards, and the Sigma Delta Chi prize for distinguished journalism. His latest book is Beyond the Killing Fields (www.beyondthekillingfields.com). This piece is reprinted with permission from The Nation Institute.

(Republished from The American Conservative by permission of author or representative)
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Tham Khảo Thêm:

Credit: Capt. Marshal Hanson, USNR (Ret.) and Capt. Scott Beaton, Statistical Source

The United States Did Not Lose The War In Vietnam, The South Vietnamese Did

The fall of Saigon happened 30 April 1975, two years AFTER the American military left Vietnam. The last American troops departed in their entirety 29 March 1973.

How could we lose a war we had already stopped fighting? We fought to an agreed stalemate. The peace settlement was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973. It called for release of all U.S. prisoners, withdrawal of U.S. forces, limitation of both sides’ forces inside South Vietnam and a commitment to peaceful reunification. The 140,000 evacuees in April 1975 during the fall of Saigon consisted almost entirely of civilians and Vietnamese military, NOT American military running for their lives. There were almost twice as many casualties in Southeast Asia (primarily Cambodia) the first two years after the fall of Saigon in 1975 than there were during the ten years the U.S. was involved in Vietnam. Thanks for the perceived loss and the countless assassinations and torture visited upon Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians goes mainly to the American media and their undying support-by-misrepresentation of the anti-War movement in the United States.

As with much of the Vietnam War, the news media misreported and misinterpreted the 1968 Tet Offensive. It was reported as an overwhelming success for the Communist forces and a decided defeat for the U.S. forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite initial victories by the Communists forces, the Tet Offensive resulted in a major defeat of those forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the designer of the Tet Offensive, is considered by some as ranking with Wellington, Grant, Lee and MacArthur as a great commander. Still, militarily, the Tet Offensive was a total defeat of the Communist forces on all fronts. It resulted in the death of some 45,000 NVA troops and the complete, if not total destruction of the Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam. The Organization of the Viet Cong Units in the South never recovered. The Tet Offensive succeeded on only one front and that was the News front and the political arena. This was another example in the Vietnam War of an inaccuracy becoming the perceived truth. However, inaccurately reported, the News Media made the Tet Offensive famous.

-Một Vài Hình Ảnh Chiến Tranh Việt Nam

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Vietnam War (100 pics)
Vietnam War (100 pics)

Vietnam War (100 pics)

Vietnam War (100 pics)

Vietnam War (100 pics)
Vietnam War (100 pics)
Vietnam War (100 pics)Vietnam War (100 pics)

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Những Chi Tiết Thống Kê Về Mỹ Quanh Cuộc Chiến Việt Nam – Statistical Source

The following information is presented “as is” as a public service.

  • 9,087,000 military personnel served on active duty during the official Vietnam era from August 5, 1964 to May 7, 1975.
  • 2,709,918 Americans served in uniform in Vietnam.
  • Vietnam Veterans represented 9.7% of their generation.
  • 240 men were awarded the Medal of Honor during the Vietnam War.
  • The first man to die in Vietnam was James Davis, in 1961. He was with the 509th Radio Research Station. Davis Station in Saigon was named for him.
  • 58,148 were killed in Vietnam.
  • 75,000 were severely disabled.
  • 23,214 were 100% disabled.
  • 5,283 lost limbs.
  • 1,081 sustained multiple amputations.
  • Of those killed, 61% were younger than 21.
  • 11,465 of those killed were younger than 20 years old.
  • Of those killed, 17,539 were married.
  • Average age of men killed: 23.1 years.
  • Five men killed in Vietnam were only 16 years old.
  • The oldest man killed was 62 years old.
  • As of April 14, 2017, there are 1,611 Americans still unaccounted for from the Vietnam War across Vietnam( 1,258), Laos(297), Cambodia(49), and China(7).
  • 97% of Vietnam Veterans were honorably discharged.
  • 91% of Vietnam Veterans say they are glad they served.
  • 74% say they would serve again, even knowing the outcome.
  • Vietnam veterans have a lower unemployment rate than the same non-vet age groups.
  • Vietnam veterans’ personal income exceeds that of our non-veteran age group by more than 18 percent.
  • 87% of Americans hold Vietnam Veterans in high esteem.
  • There is no difference in drug usage between Vietnam Veterans and non-Vietnam Veterans of the same age group (Source: Veterans Administration Study).
  • Vietnam Veterans are less likely to be in prison – only one-half of one percent of Vietnam Veterans have been jailed for crimes.
  • 85% of Vietnam Veterans made successful transitions to civilian life.

Common Vietnam War Myths Dispelled:

Myth: Common belief is that most Vietnam veterans were drafted.
Fact: 2/3 of the men who served in Vietnam were volunteers. 2/3 of the men who served in World War II were drafted. Approximately 70% of those killed in Vietnam were volunteers.

Myth: The media have reported that suicides among Vietnam veterans range from 50,000 to 100,000 – 6 to 11 times the non-Vietnam veteran population.
Fact: Mortality studies show that 9,000 is a better estimate. “The CDC Vietnam Experience Study Mortality Assessment showed that during the first 5 years after discharge, deaths from suicide were 1.7 times more likely among Vietnam veterans than non-Vietnam veterans. After that initial post-service period, Vietnam veterans were no more likely to die from suicide than non-Vietnam veterans. In fact, after the 5-year post-service period, the rate of suicides is less in the Vietnam veterans’ group.

Myth: Common belief is that a disproportionate number of blacks were killed in the Vietnam War.
Fact: 86% of the men who died in Vietnam were Caucasians, 12.5% were black, 1.2% were other races. Sociologists Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, in their recently published book “All That We Can Be,” said they analyzed the claim that blacks were used like cannon fodder during Vietnam “and can report definitely that this charge is untrue. Black fatalities amounted to 12 percent of all Americans killed in Southeast Asia, a figure proportional to the number of blacks in the U.S. population at the time and slightly lower than the proportion of blacks in the Army at the close of the war.”

Myth: Common belief is that the war was fought largely by the poor and uneducated.
Fact: Servicemen who went to Vietnam from well-to-do areas had a slightly elevated risk of dying because they were more likely to be pilots or infantry officers. Vietnam Veterans were the best educated forces our nation had ever sent into combat. 79% had a high school education or better.

Myth: The common belief is the average age of an infantryman fighting in Vietnam was 19.
Fact: Assuming KIAs accurately represented age groups serving in Vietnam, the average age of an infantryman (MOS 11B) serving in Vietnam to be 19 years old is a myth, it is actually 22. None of the enlisted grades have an average age of less than 20. The average man who fought in World War II was 26 years of age.

Myth: The common belief is that the domino theory was proved false.
Fact: The domino theory was accurate. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand stayed free of Communism because of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The Indonesians threw the Soviets out in 1966 because of America’s commitment in Vietnam. Without that commitment, Communism would have swept all the way to the Malacca Straits that is south of Singapore and of great strategic importance to the free world. If you ask people who live in these countries that won the war in Vietnam, they have a different opinion from the American news media. The Vietnam War was the turning point for Communism.

Myth: The common belief is that the fighting in Vietnam was not as intense as in World War II.
Fact: The average infantryman in the South Pacific during World War II saw about 40 days of combat in four years. The average infantryman in Vietnam saw about 240 days of combat in one year thanks to the mobility of the helicopter. One out of every 10 Americans who served in Vietnam was a casualty. 58,148 were killed and 304,000 wounded out of 2.7 million who served. Although the percent that died is similar to other wars, amputations or crippling wounds were 300 percent higher than in World War II. 75,000 Vietnam veterans are severely disabled. MEDEVAC helicopters flew nearly 500,000 missions. Over 900,000 patients were airlifted (nearly half were American). The average time lapse between wounding to hospitalization was less than one hour. As a result, less than one percent of all Americans wounded, who survived the first 24 hours, died. The helicopter provided unprecedented mobility. Without the helicopter it would have taken three times as many troops to secure the 800 mile border with Cambodia and Laos (the politicians thought the Geneva Conventions of 1954 and the Geneva Accords or 1962 would secure the border).

Myth: Kim Phuc, the little nine year old Vietnamese girl running naked from the napalm strike near Trang Bang on 8 June 1972 (shown a million times on American television) was burned by Americans bombing Trang Bang.
Fact: No American had involvement in this incident near Trang Bang that burned Phan Thi Kim Phuc. The planes doing the bombing near the village were VNAF (Vietnam Air Force) and were being flown by Vietnamese pilots in support of South Vietnamese troops on the ground. The Vietnamese pilot who dropped the napalm in error is currently living in the United States. Even the AP photographer, Nick Ut, who took the picture, was Vietnamese. The incident in the photo took place on the second day of a three day battle between the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) who occupied the village of Trang Bang and the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) who were trying to force the NVA out of the village. Recent reports in the news media that an American commander ordered the air strike that burned Kim Phuc are incorrect. There were no Americans involved in any capacity. “We (Americans) had nothing to do with controlling VNAF,” according to Lieutenant General (Ret) James F. Hollingsworth, the Commanding General of TRAC at that time. Also, it has been incorrectly reported that two of Kim Phuc’s brothers were killed in this incident. They were Kim’s cousins not her brothers.

Myth: The United States lost the war in Vietnam.
Fact: The American military was not defeated in Vietnam. The American military did not lose a battle of any consequence. From a military standpoint, it was almost an unprecedented performance. General Westmoreland quoting Douglas Pike (a professor at the University of California, Berkeley), a major military defeat for the VC and NVA.

Statistics from the Combat Area Casualty File (CACF) as of November 1993

(the CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, aka The Wall)

Average age of 58,148 killed in Vietnam was 23.11 years (Although 58,169 names are in the Nov. 93 database, only 58,148 have both event date and birth date. Event date is used instead of declared dead date for some of those who were listed as missing in action).

Deaths Average Age

Total: 58,148, 23.11 years
Enlisted: 50,274, 22.37 years
Officers: 6,598, 28.43 years
Warrants: 1,276, 24.73 years
E1 525, 20.34 years
11B MOS: 18,465, 22.55 years

Interesting Census Stats and “Been There” Wanabees:

1,713,823 of those who served in Vietnam were still alive as of August, 1995 (census figures).

During that same Census count, the number of Americans falsely claiming to have served was: 9,492,958.

As of the current Census taken during August, 2000, the surviving U.S. Vietnam Veteran population estimate is: 1,002,511. This is hard to believe, losing nearly 711,000 between ’95 and ’00. That’s 390 per day. During this Census count, the number of Americans falsely claiming to have served in-country is: 13,853,027. By this census, FOUR OUT OF FIVE WHO CLAIM TO BE VIETNAM VETS ARE NOT. This makes calculations of those alive, even in 2017, difficult to maintain.

The Department of Defense Vietnam War Service Index officially provided by The War Library originally reported with errors that 2,709,918 U.S. military personnel as having served in-country. Corrections and confirmations to this errored index resulted in the addition of 358 U.S. military personnel confirmed to have served in Vietnam but not originally listed by the Department of Defense (All names are currently on file and accessible 24/7/365).

Isolated atrocities committed by American Soldiers produced torrents of outrage from anti-war critics and the news media while Communist atrocities were so common that they received hardly any media mention at all. The United States sought to minimize and prevent attacks on civilians while North Vietnam made attacks on civilians a centerpiece of its strategy. Americans who deliberately killed civilians received prison sentences while Communists who did so received commendations. From 1957 to 1973, the National Liberation Front assassinated 36,725 Vietnamese and abducted another 58,499. The death squads focused on leaders at the village level and on anyone who improved the lives of the peasants such as medical personnel, social workers, and school teachers. – Nixon Presidential Papers.

The United States Did Not Lose The War In Vietnam, The South Vietnamese Did. Read On…

The fall of Saigon happened 30 April 1975, two years AFTER the American military left Vietnam. The last American troops departed in their entirety 29 March 1973.

How could we lose a war we had already stopped fighting? We fought to an agreed stalemate. The peace settlement was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973. It called for release of all U.S. prisoners, withdrawal of U.S. forces, limitation of both sides’ forces inside South Vietnam and a commitment to peaceful reunification. The 140,000 evacuees in April 1975 during the fall of Saigon consisted almost entirely of civilians and Vietnamese military, NOT American military running for their lives. There were almost twice as many casualties in Southeast Asia (primarily Cambodia) the first two years after the fall of Saigon in 1975 than there were during the ten years the U.S. was involved in Vietnam. Thanks for the perceived loss and the countless assassinations and torture visited upon Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians goes mainly to the American media and their undying support-by-misrepresentation of the anti-War movement in the United States.

As with much of the Vietnam War, the news media misreported and misinterpreted the 1968 Tet Offensive. It was reported as an overwhelming success for the Communist forces and a decided defeat for the U.S. forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite initial victories by the Communists forces, the Tet Offensive resulted in a major defeat of those forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the designer of the Tet Offensive, is considered by some as ranking with Wellington, Grant, Lee and MacArthur as a great commander. Still, militarily, the Tet Offensive was a total defeat of the Communist forces on all fronts. It resulted in the death of some 45,000 NVA troops and the complete, if not total destruction of the Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam. The Organization of the Viet Cong Units in the South never recovered. The Tet Offensive succeeded on only one front and that was the News front and the political arena. This was another example in the Vietnam War of an inaccuracy becoming the perceived truth. However, inaccurately reported, the News Media made the Tet Offensive famous.

Diễn văn của Eisenhower, cảnh báo về bọn tập Đoàn Kỹ Nghệ Chiến Tranh.

Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961


Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960, p. 1035- 1040
My fellow Americans:
Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.
This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.
Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.
Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.
My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.
In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.
II.
We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America’s leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.
III.
Throughout America’s adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.
Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology — global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger is poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle — with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.
Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research — these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.
But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs — balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage — balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.
The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.
IV.
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.
Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.
In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.
Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.
The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientifictechnological elite.
It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system — ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.
V.
Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society’s future, we — you and I, and our government — must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.
VI.
Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.
Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.
Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war — as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years — I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.
Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.
VII.
So — in this my last good night to you as your President — I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.
You and I — my fellow citizens — need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation’s great goals.
To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America’s prayerful and continuing aspiration:
We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.

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